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House Price Booms and the Current Account
Klaus Adam, Mannheim University and CEPR 
Pei Kuang, University of Frankfurt 
Albert Marcet, London School of Economics, CEP, and CEPR 
I. Introduction
We present a stylized open economy asset pricing model with rationally 
investing households that can quantitatively replicate the house price 
dynamics in the G7 economies over the years 2001–2008, as well as the 
associated dynamics of the current account.
In our model, boom and bust dynamics in house prices are triggered 
by macrofundamentals—for example, changes in real interest rates or 
housing preferences—but, as in the data, the response to these changes 
in fundamentals can vary across countries. Also similar to the data, 
price booms in our model are associated with an expansion of the hous-
ing stock, a deterioration of the current account, and a consumption 
boom, while the subsequent house price declines are accompanied by 
current account improvements and subdued consumption.
To study the relationship between house price movements, housing 
construction, consumption, and international borrowing, we general-
ize the closed economy asset pricing models developed previously in 
Adam and Marcet (2010, 2011) and Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2010) 
along three dimensions. First, we consider a setting with two assets, 
namely a domestically traded risky asset—the housing stock—and 
an internationally traded riskless bond. Second, we newly incorporate 
a borrowing constraint that limits household leverage and the over-
all amount of borrowing, following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Third, 
we consider a production economy with endogenous asset supply by 
explicitly incorporating a construction sector. Despite these extensions 
our model is relatively parsimonious.
The quantitative success of the model crucially rests on the assump-
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tion that we allow for households that are uncertain about how house 
prices relate to economic fundamentals. Our households are thus at par 
with academic economists who appear to be equally uncertain about 
the right model governing asset prices. We incorporate this feature by 
putting to work the concept of “internal rationality,” as developed pre-
viously in Adam and Marcet (2010, 2011). Internally rational investors 
are utility maximizers in the standard sense and entertain fully specifi ed 
and dynamically consistent beliefs about all  payoff- relevant variables 
that are external to them (including competitive market prices). Inter-
nally rational agents, however, do not fully understand how market 
prices are formed, so that their subjective probability distribution about 
prices may not be exactly equal to the true equilibrium distribution. 
Agents nevertheless have a very good understanding of how to predict 
prices. First, their beliefs about prices are near- rational in the sense that 
they are assumed to be close to the rational expectations equilibrium 
(REE) beliefs typically attributed to agents in the literature. Second, the 
model that agents entertain about price behavior is validated by actual 
data, in the sense that it would be accepted by a standard testing proce-
dure using actual data. Third, agents’ house price model is validated by 
the outcome of the asset pricing model itself, in the sense that it would 
be rejected by an econometric test only as frequently as a model yield-
ing rational expectations (RE).
Given agents’ subjective uncertainty about price, optimal behavior 
implies that they update beliefs about house price behavior by apply-
ing Bayes’ rule to market outcomes. Agents’ price beliefs thus become a 
state variable and (Bayesian) learning gives rise to a dynamic feedback 
between price beliefs and actual price outcomes. As we show, this gen-
erates a considerable amount of additional propagation and can fuel 
boom and bust dynamics in house prices; that is, price dynamics that 
temporarily delink asset prices from their fundamental value. This is 
of interest because the momentum in house price changes that can be 
observed in the data has proven diffi cult to explain with the help of ra-
tional expectations models (see Glaeser and Gyourko 2006). Therefore, 
Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saiz (2008) previously suggested that models of 
learning can help resolve this empirical puzzle.
Learning about price dynamics turns out to be important for explain-
ing the persistent rise and fall in house prices occurring over the years 
2001–2008 in the G7. Our model thereby suggests that the strong fall 
in real interest rates after the year 2000 contributed signifi cantly to the 
subsequent housing boom in some of the G7 economies. In line with 
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the empirical evidence, however, the model predicts that these move-
ments are not necessarily synchronized across countries. While some 
G7 countries experienced house price booms (United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada, Italy, France), they did so to very different degrees, 
and other countries ( Japan, Germany) even displayed stagnant house 
prices over this period. The model successfully replicates this heteroge-
neity because the predicted house price evolution is highly dependent 
on agents’ price beliefs at the time of the interest rate reduction, which 
in turn depend on the behavior of house prices in the respective econo-
mies prior to the fall in the real rate.
Our learning model is also compatible with observed house price 
expectations. Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) use the Michigan Survey 
of Consumers to document that the share of agents believing prices to 
increase further comoves positively with the house price level over the 
last housing boom. Specifi cally, the share of optimistic agents reached 
its peak precisely at the time when house prices peaked. This fact is 
consistent with the learning we propose and is diffi cult to reconcile 
with rational expectations.
The paper also suggests important policy lessons. Since the world 
interest rate is an exogenous parameter in the model, we can study 
the effects of alternative interest rate scenarios. For the US economy 
the model predicts that the recent US house price boom would have 
been largely avoided, and the current account defi cit would have been 
considerably smaller, if interest rates had fallen by less at the begin-
ning of the 2000s. Although such a link between real interest rates and 
house price booms is frequently discussed in the press,1 to the best of 
our knowledge we present the fi rst formal model in which a sizable and 
persistent house price boom can arise from a persistent reduction in the 
level of real interest rates.2
The paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the re-
lated literature on house price fl uctuations and current account dynam-
ics. Section III presents stylized facts we seek to explain about the be-
havior of house prices, the current account, and private consumption in 
the G7. Section IV introduces a stylized open economy model, derives 
the household optimality conditions and the equations determining the 
equilibrium outcomes for a general set of subjective price beliefs. In 
Section V we show that the model has diffi culties in replicating salient 
features of the data under RE. Section VI introduces subjective price be-
liefs that are close to the REE beliefs (in distribution) and learning about 
house price behavior. In Section VII we show how the learning model 
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can qualitatively account for the observed dynamics in house prices, 
current accounts, and consumption in the G7. Sections VIII and IX then 
explore the quantitative model performance. Finally, Section X shows 
that learning agents who are confronted with the  model- generated 
house price outcomes would reject their model of house price behavior 
approximately only as often as a model yielding rational expectations. 
A conclusion briefl y summarizes.
II. Related Literature
Relatively few papers study house price dynamics within dynamic 
equilibrium models before the recent recession. Important exceptions 
are Iacoviello (2005), who develops a monetary business cycle model 
with housing and collateral constraints, and Lustig and van Nieuwer-
burgh (2005), who study the role of house prices and housing collateral 
for the pricing of stocks.
Some recent papers use models of learning to explain observed house 
price data. Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), for example, pres-
ent a model in which a temporary house price boom emerges from in-
fectious optimism that eventually dissipates once investors become in-
creasingly certain about fundamentals. Laibson and Mollerstrom (2010) 
present a model in which aggregate wealth fl uctuates because agents 
learn about the expected future productivity of capital goods. Positive 
news about future productivity is shown to generate an increase in as-
set prices, a consumption boom, and a current account defi cit. The small 
volatility of macroeconomic fundamentals, however, poses a problem 
for such news driven explanations of asset price fl uctuations.
Other papers also account for some of the empirical features that 
we describe. Matsuyama (1990) provides a theoretical analysis of 
the income effect of government spending, housing subsidies, and 
 sector- specifi c productivity change on residential investment and the 
current account. He shows that anticipated government spending 
shocks lead to a decline in house prices and residential investment, but 
that the effect on the current account depends on whether housing and 
nondurable consumption are substitutes or complements. Punzi (2006) 
evaluates the quantitative impact of the housing market on the current 
account using a two- sector, two- country dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) model with heterogenous agents and a housing 
collateral constraint. In her setup, housing preference shocks generate 
a negative correlation between house prices and the current account. 
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Gete (2010) seeks to explain current account and housing price dynam-
ics through  cross- country heterogeneity in the evolution of housing 
demand. If the desire to smooth consumption across housing services 
and nondurable consumption goods is strong or if households’ prefer-
ences feature low intratemporal substitution elasticity, then an increase 
in housing demand can give rise to a house price increase and a current 
account defi cit.
III. Stylized Facts
A. US House Prices and the Current Account 1996–2008
A variety of house price measures indicate that house prices in the 
United States increased considerably over the years 1996–2006. Figure 1 
depicts indices of the real house price (RHP), the  price- to- income (PIR) 
ratio, and the  price- to- rent (PRR) ratio normalizing indices to a value 
of 100 in the year 1996.3 Prices increased—depending on the preferred 
house price measure—between 24% and 58% in the subsequent 10 
years. While house prices started increasing well before the year 2000, 
all house price measures indicate that over 70% of the total increase 
takes place after the year 2000.
Fig. 1. United States: House price measures and the current account
This content downloaded from 193.145.219.216 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 04:43:55 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
82 Adam, Kuang, and Marcet
Figure 1 also depicts the US current account defi cit (in % of GDP).4 
The current account and the house price are strongly negatively associ-
ated over time, with the defi cit widening considerably throughout the 
period 1996–2006, except for a slight and temporary improvement in 
the recession year 2001. Once house prices started to revert direction in 
the years 2007 and 2008, however, the US current account defi cit also 
started to narrow, a development that accelerated in the year 2009 (see 
the current account data in table 1).
Table 1 reports the annual change in the value of the US housing 
stock (at market prices), together with the size of the current account 
defi cit.5 The bottom row in the table reveals that in the period 1996–
2005, any one- dollar increase in the value of the US housing stock was 
on average associated with a 0.26 increase in international borrowing 
in the form of a current account defi cit. This relationship is remarkably 
stable over these years (the standard deviation is just 0.04), but changes 
after the year 2006 when current account defi cits improve only mildly, 
despite the domestic housing value either increasing less strongly (in 
2006) or decreasing substantially (after 2007).
B. US: Real Rates, Consumption, and Construction
The house price and current account developments in the United States 
highlighted in the previous section were accompanied by a number of 
other broad macroeconomic trends that we now describe. We thereby 
focus on three variables, namely the behavior of real interest rates, 
private consumption, and construction activity
The acceleration of the US house price increase and the widening of 
current account defi cits after the years 2000 / 2001 coincided with a con-
siderable fall in ex ante real interest rates. Figure 2 illustrates this fact by 
depicting the one- year adjustable mortgage rate, subtracting from it the 
median expected one year ahead Consumer Price Index (CPI) infl ation 
rate from the survey of professional forecasters.6 The fi gure shows that 
ex ante real interest rates considerably dropped around the beginning 
of the year 2001 and stayed low for an extended period of time, before 
rising again around the year 2006. Overall, real interest rates display 
considerably less persistence than real house prices. While real interest 
rates completed a full cycle over the years 1996 to 2006, house prices 
steadily increased throughout this period. It thus appears far from im-
mediate to establish a close link between house prices and real interest 
rates in the data.
To capture the interest rate evolution in a stylized way, we consider 
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three subperiods: a period with relatively high real rates over the years 
1996–2000, a period with relatively low real rates over the years 2001–
2005, and a period of moderately high rates in the years 2006–2008. The 
horizontal lines in fi gure 2 indicate the average interest rate for each of 
these subperiods.
Figure 3 depicts real private consumption growth together with vari-
ous measures of house price growth.7 Private consumption expanded 
over the years 1996–2006 by more than 3% each year, but came down af-
ter house prices reverted direction in 2007 and 2008. As has been docu-
mented before, there is thus a positive association between house price 
and consumption growth in the data.
The number of new houses built in the United States also strongly 
expanded over the period 1996–2006. Figure 4 reports the number of 
new housing units completed in the United States together with vari-
ous house price measures.8 The fi gure shows that the level of house 
prices and the number of housing completions are strongly positively 
correlated.
C. Cross- Sectional Evidence from G7 Economies
The facts documented for the US economy in the previous section ap-
pear in similar form in the  cross- section of G7 economies.9
Fig. 2. United States: Ex ante real mortgage rate
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Fig. 3. United States: House price changes and consumption growth
Fig. 4. United States: House prices and new housing completions
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Table 2 shows that over the period 2001–2007, house price in-
creases and current account surpluses are negatively correlated in 
the  cross- section of G7 countries.10 Countries with larger house price 
booms thus tended to also have larger current account defi cits. This 
holds independently of the considered house price measure (RHP, PIR, 
PRR). Furthermore, house price increases are strongly positively cor-
related with real private consumption growth over the same period, 
showing that countries with larger house price booms also tended to 
have larger consumption booms. Finally, as shown in table 3, the house 
price reversals in 2007–2008 are similarly strongly negatively correlated 
with changes in the current account surplus. These  cross- sectional rela-
tionships are consistent with the correlation over time that can observed 
for US data.
Although the G7 evidence confi rms the comovements between house 
price, current account, and consumption dynamics documented for the 
United States, there exists a considerable amount of  cross- sectional het-
erogeneity across the G7 economies. Figure 5 illustrates this fact by de-
picting the real house price indices for the G7 economies, normalizing 
the house price indices to 100 for the year 2000.11 It is clear that house 
prices show high volatility and high persistence in all countries. Table 4 
documents the latter fact by reporting the average serial correlation of 
housing prices over time across the G7 countries.
Importantly, however, the large low frequency movements in house 
Table 2
Cross- Sectional Correlations in the G7
House Price Change 
2001–2007  
Current Account Surplus 
(2001–2007, Cum. Sum 
in % of GDP)  
Real Priv. Cons. Increase 
(2001–2007, Cum. Sum 
in %) 
Real house price –.55 .72
Price- rent ratio –.42 .75
Price- income ratio  –.52  .61
Table 3
Cross- Sectional Correlations in the G7
House Price Change 2007–2008 
Change in Current Account Surplus 
2008 vs. 2007 (in % of GDP)
Real house –.75
Price- rent ratio –.90
Price- income ratio  –.83
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prices are not synchronized across countries. While four countries expe-
rienced sustained and even larger house price increases after 2000 than 
the United States, Japan and Germany witnessed real price decreases.
IV. An Open Economy Model with Housing
This section presents a parsimonious open economy model with endog-
enous housing supply in which households can internationally borrow 
for consumption and investment purposes. Household borrowing is 
thereby subject to a  collateral- based borrowing constraint, as in Kiyo-
taki and Moore (1997).
Preferences and Beliefs. We consider an economy populated by a unit 
mass of utility maximizing households. Households are identical in 
terms of preferences and beliefs—a fact that is not known to agents12—
with the representative household maximizing
Fig. 5. Real house prices in the G7 (indices, normalized to 100 in year 2000)
Table 4
Autocorrelation of G7 House Prices
House prices measure  G7 average autocorrelation 1996–2008
Real house prices .98
Price- to- rent ratio .97
Price- to- income  .97
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E0
P
t=0
∞∑ t(tht + ct), (1)
where  ct ≥ 0 denotes consumption of goods,  ht ≥ 0 consumption of hous-
ing services,   ∈ (0, 1) the time discount factor, and  t > 0 a housing pref-
erence shock. We assume that the preference shock evolves according to
  ln t = ln t−1 + ln εt, (2)
with εt being an i.i.d. innovation satisfying  E[ln εt] = 0 and  E[(ln εt)2] = ε2. 
The preference shock 
 
t  captures changes in the population’s prefer-
ences for housing services relative to consumption. As we argue follow-
ing, the assumed unit root specifi cation is broadly consistent with the 
available data.
The household’s expectation in (1) is computed using a (potentially 
subjective) probability measure  P , which is defi ned over the space of 
 payoff- relevant outcomes Ω. The measure  P  assigns probabilities to all 
subsets of Ω in a  sigma- algebra  B, so that agents entertain a standard 
probability space  (P, B, ). Importantly, the set Ω includes all sequences 
of  payoff- relevant variables that agents take as given. This includes fun-
damental shocks, but also competitive market prices. Agents’ choices in 
a given period t are then functions of the realization of these 
 payoff- relevant variables up to t. While the measure  P  itself is time- 
invariant (i.e., dynamically consistent), it will often imply that rational 
agents are learning about the house price process. This is the case, for 
example, if  P  is generated by a model that agents entertain about the 
stochastic process of house prices and by some prior beliefs about un-
known parameters describing this process. Further details about the 
underlying probability space are given in Section IV, subsection A.
Budget Constraint and Collateral Constraint. We let  Ht ≥ 0 denote the 
stock of houses owned by the household in period t. The housing stock 
yields housing services ht according to 
  ht = G(Ht) (3)
for some twice continuously differentiable and (weakly) concave func-
tion  G(⋅), satisfying the conditions  limH→0 ′G (H) = ∞ and  limH→H ′G (H) = −∞ 
for some  H ≤ ∞. We impose this latter condition for technical conve-
nience: it insures the existence of an optimal house holding plan for all 
beliefs about house prices, satisfying the restriction that house prices 
cannot become negative. The previous assumptions imply that there is 
a bliss point HB such that  ′G (HB) = 0; with the additional assumption 
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that this bliss point is unique we have  ′G (H) ≥ 0 for  H < HB and 
 ′G (H) ≤ 0 for  H > HB. For reasons that will become apparent later, the 
housing stock may exceed this bliss point in equilibrium.
Using the consumption good as numeraire and letting qt denote the 
price of houses, the agent’s fl ow budget constraint is
  ct + (Ht − (1 − d)Ht−1)qt + Rbt−1 + kt = yt + bt + t + kt−1pt, (4)
where  yt ≥ 0 denotes an exogenous income process, bt the household’s 
new loans, R the gross real interest rate on maturing loans  bt−1,  d ∈ 0, 1), 
the rate at which the housing stock depreciates, πt profi ts from the own-
ership of (housing development) fi rms, and  kt ≥ 0 capital sold to com-
petitive housing developers who use this capital as an input for the 
production of new houses. This capital stock fully depreciates in one 
period. To capture time lags in housing production and for simplicity 
we assume that the price pt remunerating kt –1 is a competitive forward 
price that is fi xed in period t – 1.
For notational simplicity we do not introduce a competitive market 
for housing services ht. While the analysis would remain unchanged 
with such a market, it would imply that the competitive market for 
housing services is given by 
 
t . For this reason we interpret  t  as the 
rental price for housing in the remaining part of the paper. And to show 
that our unit root assumption for  log t is indeed reasonable, table 5 re-
ports the  Dickey- Fuller test statistics for a unit root model with drift 
based on the log of the rental rate for housing in the respective coun-
tries.13 For the considered sample, the 10% critical value for this statistic 
is –2.614, which is far from any of the reported test statistics. This sug-
gests that our stochastic specifi cation for 
 
t is indeed reasonable.
We assume that consumers’ borrowing is subject to a collateral con-
straint of the form
 
 
bt ≤  Et
Pqt+1
R
Ht (5)
as in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The parameter   ∈ 0, 1 − d] captures 
the share of houses owned by the household today that can serve as 
Table 5
Dickey- Fuller Test for Assumed ξt Process
  United States Japan Germany France United Kingdom Canada
t- statistic –.921  –.848  –.383  –.131  .696  –.162
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collateral to lenders; this parameter is assumed fi xed. A value of θ < 1 
thereby incorporates the effects of physical depreciation of houses, as 
well as the possibility that seizing the collateral in case of default is 
costly for lenders.
The borrowing constraint (5) is key to understanding the model- 
implied relation between house prices and current account dynam-
ics. In a situation where actual and expected prices tend to grow, the 
borrowing constraint will be relatively loose. Agents can thus increase 
international borrowing when house prices grow, thereby establish-
ing a connection between house price booms and current account 
defi cits.14
We assume that there is a suffi ciently wealthy risk- neutral interna-
tional lender that holds the same beliefs  P  as domestic agents. The in-
ternational lender has a time discount rate R–1, which we assume to 
satisfy  R
−1 ∈ (, 1). The latter implies that the international lender is 
more patient than domestic households. In addition to simplifying the 
analysis, it captures the presence of China and other emerging econo-
mies as large and patient international lenders in the global economy. 
We also assume that the market for collateralized loans is internation-
ally fully integrated. With these assumptions, the world equilibrium 
interest rate for collateralized loans is given by R.15
Housing Supply. We now turn to the determinants of housing supply. 
There exists a competitive housing development sector consisting of a 
unit mass of housing development fi rms. The representative fi rm op-
erates a decreasing returns to scale technology for constructing new 
houses. The amount of new housing produced at t is given by 
 ()
−1kt−1
 ,
with  kt−1 ≥ 0 denoting the amount of development capital used by hous-
ing developers and   ∈ (0, 1). To capture time lags in housing construc-
tion we assume that fi rms choose the level of input kt–1 in period t – 1; 
that is, one period in advance.
Firms in the housing sector are owned by the consumer in the small 
open economy, who receive profi ts as lump sum transfers. Since fi rms 
do not have a true intertemporal maximization problem (there is no 
state variable in the fi rms’ problem), we can assume that they maximize 
expected profi ts from housing construction by choosing16 
 
max
kt−1≥0
Et−1
P 1

kt−1
 qt − ptkt−1⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ,
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where pt is the price of period t inputs purchased from households in 
period t – 1 in a competitive forward market. The  profi t- maximizing 
input choice is given by 
 
kt−1
∗ = Et−1P qt
pt
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
1/(1−)
and determines a supply function for new houses of the form
 
 
S(Et−1
P qt, pt) =
1

Et−1
P qt
pt
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
 /(1−)
, (6)
with  /(1 − ) denoting the elasticity of housing supply with respect to 
the expected selling price  Et−1
P qt. The housing stock then evolves accord-
ing to 
  Ht = (1 − d)Ht−1 + S(Et−1P qt, pt) (7)
and developers’ realized profi ts in period t are given by
 
 
t =
1

Et−1
P qt
pt
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
 /(1−)
qt − pt Et−1
P qt
pt
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
 /(1−)
. (8)
A. The Underlying Probability Space
We now describe details of the underlying probability space  (P, B, ). 
The probability space is entirely standard from the viewpoint of prob-
ability theory, but will be extended (or more general) when compared 
to the approach taken in the RE literature. Specifi cally, we defi ne the 
state space of outcomes as
 
 ≡ p × q ×  × y × ,
where  X = ∏t= 0∞ R+ is the space of possible infi nite sequences for the 
variable  X ∈ {p, q, , y, }. We thus do not restrict attention to the history 
of “fundamental” or exogenous variables ( , y), instead including all 
sequences of  payoff- relevant variables that agents take as given in their 
decision problem. This includes prices and profi ts, in addition to the 
fundamental variables.
The set of all possible histories up to period t for some variable X 
is then denoted by  X
t , and its typical element  X
t ∈Xt , except for 
p where 
 
p
t  denotes histories up to t + 1. Furthermore, we let 
 
t = p
t × qt × t × yt × t  denote the set of histories of all exoge-
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nous variables up to period t, and  t ∈t its typical element. Variable 
 B is the  sigma- algebra of all Borel subsets of Ω and  P  a measure on 
this  sigma- algebra. The probability space  (P, B, ) is assumed com-
mon to all agents, including fi rms, domestic consumers, and foreign 
agents.
The previous setup implies that agents can condition their decisions 
on the history of all observed realizations; that is, consumers choose for 
each t
  ct, ht, Ht, bt, kt( ) : t → R5. (9)
Conditioning on all observed realizations will be optimal whenever 
agents do not know how a given history of fundamentals  (y, )
t maps 
into outcomes for prices and profi ts. This differs from a RE setting 
where prices (pt, qt) and profi ts πt are known functions of the history of 
fundamentals, implying that conditioning also on the history of prices 
and profi ts would simply be redundant.
Agents express their uncertainty about the joint distribution of prices 
and fundamentals using the probability measure  P . In the spirit of 
studying small deviations from rational expectations, we will specify in 
the following a probability measure  P  that is close—but not exactly 
equal—to the rational expectations equilibrium beliefs.
B. Household Optimality Conditions
We now derive the conditions characterizing optimal household behav-
ior. We thereby proceed by assuming that a maximum for the house-
hold problem exists.17 First- order conditions are then necessary and 
suffi cient for household optimality because the objective function is 
concave and the constraints are linear in the households’ choices.
Households maximize the objective (1) subject to the constraints (3), 
(4), and (5). Taking explicitly into account the nonnegativity constraints 
for ct and kt, the Lagrangian of the household problem is given by
 
max
{ct , Ht ,bt ,kt}
E0
P
t=0
∞∑t tG(Ht) + ct − t[ct + (Ht − (1 − d)Ht−1)qt + bt−1R + kt−yt − bt − t − kt−1pt] + t(EtPqt + 1Ht − Rbt) + tct + tkt
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
,
where H–1, k–1, and b–1 are given initial conditions and the prices  {qt, pt}, R 
are given.
The household’s  fi rst- order conditions (FOCs) are 
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  ct : t = 1 + t with t ≥ 0 & ctt = 0 (10)
  Ht : t ′G (Ht) − tqt + (1 − d)EtPt+1qt+1 + tEtPqt+1 = 0 (11)
  bt : t = REt
Pt+1 + tR with t ≥ 0
  & (Et
Pqt+1Ht − Rbt)t = 0 (12)
  kt : t = pt+1Et
Pt+1 + t with t ≥ 0 & ktt = 0 (13)
for all  t ≥ 0. Equation (10) implies that  t ≥ 1.
We now describe the evolution of the equilibrium variables. In the 
main text we thereby focus on the case where the nonnegativity con-
straint for ct is not binding for all  t ≤ T + 1, where T denotes the sample 
size.18 Since  R < 1/, the optimal solution then implies that the con-
sumer will optimally borrow as much as possible, so that the collateral 
constraint is binding in each period  t ≤ T. Then, provided the fl uctua-
tions in house prices and house price expectations are not too large, the 
nonnegativity constraint for consumption will indeed not be violated.19 
In this case,  t = 0 for all  t = 0, ..., T so that the FOC (10) is satisfi ed for 
 t = 1 and the FOC (12) holds for
 
t =
1
R
−  > 0
for all  t = 0, ..., T. Using these results and equation (11) one obtains
  qt = Et
Pqt+1 + t ′G (Ht) (14)
where 
 
 
 ≡ (1 − d − ) + 
R
< 1. (15)
Given qt and  Et
Pqt+1, equation (14) determines the optimal amount of 
houses demanded by the household. Since  ′G (⋅) continuously varies be-
tween +∞ and −∞, this equation always has a solution for the optimal 
housing stock Ht > 0, for any given pair  (qt, Et
Pqt+1).
Importantly, for qt < ρ  Et
Pqt+1, equation (14) implies  ′G (Ht) < 0, so that 
housing demand exceeds the bliss point level HB. If houses are expected 
to appreciate suffi ciently strongly, it can become individually optimal to 
purchase housing above the bliss point since housing investment gener-
ates capital gains and relaxes the household’s borrowing constraint.
When the collateral constraint is binding in the fi rst T + 1 periods, 
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the optimal level of borrowing follows from the binding collateral con-
straint and is given by
  btR = Et
Pqt+1Ht. (16)
The capital offered by the consumer to housing developers is only re-
stricted to satisfy
 (1 − pt+1)kt = 0,
so that either  pt = 
−1 or  kt = 0. If the nonnegativity constraint on k is 
nonbinding, the agent is indifferent between consuming today and in-
creasing by one unit the capital sold to fi rms in exchange for  −1 units of 
consumption tomorrow. Since fi rms’ production function implies that 
fi rms always have a positive demand for k, market clearing occurs at 
  pt = 
−1, (17)
with kt being determined by fi rms’ demand function.
Finally, consumption can be obtained residually from the fl ow budget
  ct = yt + bt + t − Ht − (1 − d)Ht−1( ) qt − bt−1R − kt + kt−1−1, (18)
where we imposed (17).
C. Equilibrium Dynamics for General Beliefs  P
For arbitrary and given beliefs  P , the equilibrium evolution of the 
house price qt and the housing stock Ht must satisfy equations (14) and 
(7), rewritten here as 
  qt = Et
Pqt+1 + t ′G (Ht) (19)
  Ht+1 = (1 − d)Ht + S(EtPqt+1, −1). (20)
These equations can be solved for the process  {qt, Ht}t=0
∞ . Borrowing then 
follows from equation (16), housing supply from (6), profi ts from (8), 
and equilibrium consumption from (18).
V. Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE)
We now assume rational expectations ( Et
P[⋅] = Et[⋅]) and determine the 
REE for the case where the nonnegativity constraint on consumption is 
never binding. We fi rst fi nd the deterministic steady state, then analyze 
the effects of preference and income shocks, and fi nally discuss the ef-
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fects of changes in international real interest rates. As will become clear 
from the following discussion, under RE the model has great diffi culties 
in replicating the observed house price dynamics.
A. Deterministic Steady State
We start out by determining the deterministic steady state; that is, the 
REE in which  t =  and  yt = y for all t. Letting variables without time 
subscripts denote steady outcomes, equations (19) and (20) imply
 
 
qss =  ′G (H ss)
1 −   (21)
 
 
H ss = 1
d
(qss) /(1−), (22)
which jointly determine a unique steady state value for  q
ss and  H ss.20 
Steady state capital, borrowing, and consumption are given by
 
kss = (qss)1/(1−)
bss =  q
ssH ss
R
css = y +  1
R
− 1⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ qssH ss − (qss)1/(1−).
B. Stochastic Equilibrium: Linear Approximation
We now analyze the effects of shocks to housing preferences 
 
t  and 
household income yt. In the interest of deriving closed form approxi-
mate solutions, we fi rst consider solutions to equations (19) and (20) 
when the function  G(⋅) is linearized around its steady state. This simpli-
fi es the analysis because it allows using results previously derived in 
Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2010) to describe the model behavior un-
der learning. We consider a concave function  G(⋅) separately in the fol-
lowing.
Substituting  ′G (Ht) by  ′G (H ss) in equation (19) implies that the REE 
house price to rent ratio is (approximately) given by 
 
 
qt
RE
t
= ′G (H ss)
1 −  , (23)
so that log house price growth evolves according to
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ln
qt
RE
qt−1
RE
= ln 1 + ln εt. (24)
For the linear approximation we thus have  Etqt+1
RE = qt
RE and  pt = 
−1, so 
that the housing stock approximately evolves according to:21
 
Ht+1
RE = (1 − d)HtRE + 1 (qt
RE) /(1−).
The previous fi ndings show that preference and income shocks both 
fail to affect the  price- to- rent ratio (23) and that the real house price 
follows a unit root in this approximate REE. With rational expectations, 
preference and income shocks thus cannot explain the large swings in 
the  price- to- rent ratio and are unlikely to explain the persistent boom 
and bust patterns in real house prices observed in the data.
C. Stochastic Equilibrium:  Linear- Quadratic Approximation
While the linear approximation considered in the previous section is 
convenient, assuming linearity of  G(⋅) violates our basic assumptions 
required to guarantee existence of an equilibrium. We therefore con-
sider a model with a concave  G(⋅) in all subsequent computations, but 
use the linear approximation from the previous section for intuitive ex-
planations. The appendix shows that with a  linear- quadratic approxi-
mation to  G(⋅), the REE dynamics evolve according to
 
qˆt = a
REˆt + bREHˆt
Hˆt+1 = c
REHˆt + dREˆt,
where hatted variables denote deviations from the steady state and 
 (a
RE, bRE, cRE, dRE) are given coefficients satisfying  a
RE > 0,  b
RE < 0, 
 0 < c
RE < 1, and  d
RE > 0.
Importantly, preference shocks still cannot explain the observed 
house price dynamics. A positive innovation to the rental price 
 
t  in-
creases the rental price on impact, but leads to a reduction of the equi-
librium price in the subsequent period.22 The model will thus have dif-
fi culties with generating a persistent increase of the house price. 
Furthermore, the previous equation implies that the stock of housing 
and the  price- to- rent ratio move in opposite directions. This is intuitive, 
since the  price- to- rent ratio  qt/t is equal to the discounted sum of fu-
ture  ′G  and a higher housing stock H reduces the value of  ′G . This fea-
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ture of the rational expectations model is also hard to reconcile with the 
data, where the  price- to- rent ratio and the stock of houses display 
strong positive comovement.
D. Calibration, House Prices, and Real Interest Rates
We now analyze the effects of unexpected changes in the real interest 
rate for the REE house price. As equation (23) shows, a reduction in 
real interest rates generates an increase in the real house price and in 
the  price- to- rent ratio. As we document later, however, it is unlikely 
that changes in real interest rates can properly account for the observed 
house price dynamics.
To analyze the effects of real interest rate changes we assume that the 
economy starts from a steady state position in the year 2000. We then 
subject it to the stylized changes in the real interest rate indicated by 
the dashed line in fi gure 2. Specifi cally, we consider a persistent and 
unexpected decrease in the real rate in the year 2001, followed by an 
equally unexpected real rate increase in the year 2006.23 The effects of 
anticipated real rate changes will be discussed separately later.
The remaining model parameters are calibrated as follows. We set θ = 
0.26, which is the 1996–2005 average of the annual value change change 
in the US housing stock over the current account defi cit (see table 1). 
For the annual discount factor we choose δ = 0.96, so that the discount 
factor is slightly below the real interest rate path that we feed into the 
model.24 We set the annual house depreciation rate equal to d = 3%.
To illustrate the effects of interest rate changes we abstract from un-
certainty about preference shocks: we set  t =  and normalize   ′G (H) 
such that the initial steady state real house price in the year 2000 (prior 
to any change in the real interest rate) is equal to 100. Finally, for rea-
sons that will become clear later on, we choose a value for the constant 
second derivative  ′′G  so that there is a small amount of curvature; that 
is, we set  − ′′G H ss/ ′G = 0.007 . None of the results shown below prove 
particularly sensitive to the assumed parameter values.
The resulting REE real house price dynamics from unexpected 
changes in the interest rate are illustrated by the upper line in fi gure 6.25 
The fi gure reveals that RE imply that house price changes occur simul-
taneously with unanticipated changes in real interest rates.26 For the US 
economy, however, one cannot fi nd a close simultaneous association 
between changes in the real mortgage rates and house prices changes. 
Mortgage rates, for example, stayed approximately constant between 
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the beginning of 2003 until the end of 2005 (see fi gure 2) while house 
prices increased strongly over these two years. Likewise, real mortgage 
rates were roughly constant over the years 2006–2008, while house 
prices decreased considerably over these years. Due to this close as-
sociation with interest rates, house prices under RE do not exhibit the 
persistence that can be observed for house price fl uctuations in the data.
 Furthermore, the amplitude of the fl uctuations generated by interest 
rate shocks tends to be small compared to the data. The RE model justi-
fi es a 4% appreciation between 2000 and 2005, while the United States 
experienced a tenfold increase over this period. From a RE viewpoint, it 
thus appears diffi cult to account for the observed house price dynamics 
using changes in real interest rates as a driving force.
Even greater diffi culties arise if one assumes instead that agents fully 
anticipate future changes in real interest rates, instead of assuming that 
any given change is considered permanent. If agents anticipate the 2006 
real interest rate increase, then house prices evolve according to the 
lower line shown in fi gure 6. The initial house price increase in 2001 is 
then even smaller and followed by a gradual decrease, due to the antic-
ipated real rate increase (and house price decrease) in the year 2006. In 
the data, however, house prices increased strongly after the year 2001.
We can conclude that under RE it is diffi cult to account for the US 
house price dynamics using the observed interest rate dynamics. Rather 
than predicting house price increases over the years 2001–2006, RE pre-
dicts that house prices move together with interest rates, that fl uctua-
tions are fairly small, and that house price persistence is relatively low.
VI. Specifying Near Rational Beliefs
Under the rational expectations hypothesis, agents are assumed to 
know that the joint distribution over exogenous shocks and market 
prices has a singularity and where exactly this singularity is located.27 
Yet even expert economists rarely agree on the correct economic model 
linking fundamentals to prices. For this reason it appears of interest to 
consider agents that face similar doubts and to relax the assumption 
that agents know the correct model of price behavior.
We shall assume that agents express uncertainty about the true price 
process by formulating a perceived joint distribution  P  over prices and 
fundamentals. This joint distribution  P  does not necessarily have to 
incorporate a singularity linking house prices to the history of funda-
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mentals. In the following we construct a specifi c measure  P  deviating 
from RE beliefs along exactly this dimension. Subsection A of Section VI 
then shows how one can impose further restrictions that insure that the 
model outcomes generated by  P  are indeed close to the beliefs enter-
tained by agents. And subsection B of Section VI shows that our speci-
fi cation for  P  is consistent with the behavior of house prices in the data.
We defi ne the probability space  (B, ) as in subsection A of Section IV. 
And to simplify the analysis we assume that agents have correct beliefs 
about all variables except for house prices; that is, agents hold rational 
expectations about the exogenous processes  {yt, t}t=0
∞  and about 
 {pt = 
−1}t=0
∞ .28 We relax, however, the assumption that agents believe that 
average house price growth is equal to zero at all times, as is implied by 
the approximate REE outcome (24). Instead, we consider agents who 
believe that the process for house price growth evolves according to 
 
 
ln
qt
qt−1
= ln t + ln vt, (25)
where βt denotes a time- varying persistent component and vt a transi-
tory component. This relaxation of beliefs relative to the REE outcome 
(24) is motivated by the empirical evidence on house price behavior, 
which displays periods of persistently increasing prices ( ln t > 0 for a 
number of periods) and periods of persistently falling prices ( ln t < 0 
for a number of periods).
For simplicity, we shall assume that the persistent component follows 
a random walk29
  ln t = ln t−1 + ln t, (26)
and that the innovations are given by
 
 
ln vt
ln t
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
∼ iiN 0
0
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ,
v
2 0
0 

2
⎛
⎝⎜⎜
⎞
⎠⎟⎟
⎛
⎝⎜⎜
⎞
⎠⎟⎟
. (27)
Agents’ prior beliefs about the persistent component at time zero is as-
sumed normal with
  ln 0 ∼ N(ln m0, 0
2) (28)
and  0
2 denoting the steady state (Kalman fi lter) uncertainty; that is, 
 
0
2 =
−

2 + (

2)2 + 4

2

2
2
.
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The prior beliefs (28), together with the process (25) through (27), com-
pletely specify agents’ beliefs  P  about house price behavior.
The present setting gives rise to a learning problem because agents 
observe the realized house price growth rates  qt/qt−1, but do not sepa-
rately observe the persistent component βt and the transitory compo-
nent vt. This requires that agents optimally update their beliefs about βt 
in the light of new house price growth observations.
We complete the overall description of  P  by assuming that agents 
know how to map a history of prices into profi ts. In other words, agents 
know that profi ts in t are given by a function  (Et−1
P qt, qt) equal to the 
 right- hand side of equation (8) for  pt = 
−1.
A. Insuring Near Rationality of Beliefs
In this section we impose further restrictions on the beliefs  P  of agents 
to insure that these beliefs are close (in distribution) to the outcomes 
generated by the model. We thereby proceed as follows. First, we show 
how to impose restrictions on  P  so that these beliefs approach (in dis-
tribution) the beliefs entertained by agents in the linearized REE (24) 
for any given fi nite amount of time.30 Second, as agents’ beliefs con-
verge to the REE beliefs, model outcomes equally converge to the REE 
outcomes (in distribution) because equilibrium prices and quantities 
are continous functions of agents’ beliefs. Since beliefs and model out-
comes both converge (in distribution) to the linearized REE outcome 
(24), agents’ beliefs will be approximately validated by the model be-
havior.
To insure that the beliefs  P  are close (in distribution) to the REE be-
liefs, we proceed as follows. First, we center initial beliefs so as to be 
consistent with the average growth rate of prices in the REE (24); that is, 
we choose  m0 = 1. Agents thus initially believe that there is no growth 
in real house prices on average. Second, we consider the case where the 
innovation variance of the persistent house price component vanishes 
(i.e., 
 


2 → 0). As a result of this second assumption, prior uncertainty 
σ0 about initial price growth also vanishes ( 0
2 → 0). Agents’ prior be-
liefs thus become increasingly concentrated at the point βt = 1. Formally, 
as  0
2 → 0 agents’ beliefs about prices converge to the REE beliefs (24) in 
distribution (or “in law”).31
This shows that for suffi ciently small values of 
 


2, house price beliefs 
are indeed close to the model implied beliefs. In our empirical applica-
tion, we shall consider small but positive values for 
 


2. Section X then 
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shows that agents would hardly be able to reject their belief specifi ca-
tion for the empirically calibrated value of 
 


2.
B. Agents’ Beliefs and House Price Behavior in the Data
This section shows that the belief specifi cation (25) and (26) is also 
consistent with the behavior of actual house prices in the data. Specifi -
cally, we derive testable implications from our belief specifi cation and 
evaluate to what extent these are consistent with the behavior of the G7 
house price data.
The belief equations (25) and (26) imply that  ln qt/qt−1 has a unit root 
and that   ln qt/qt−1 is an MA(1) process of the form
 
 
 ln
qt
qt−1
= ln t + ln vt − ln vt−1. (29)
Conditional on all the shocks being normally distributed, the fact that 
  ln qt/qt−1 is an MA(1) process exhausts the empirical implications of 
the agents’ model (25) through (27).32
One might be tempted to test (29) using an augmented  Dickey- Fuller 
(ADF) test with a number of lags to capture the fact that   ln qt/qt−1 is 
serially correlated under the null hypothesis. This approach is problem-
atic, however, because 
 


2 is small relative to  
2, so that the autoregres-
sive coeffi cients decay only very slowly with the lag length. This would 
require including a very large number of lags to have a valid ADF test, 
thereby greatly reducing the degrees of freedom and the power of the 
test.
A more attractive approach is based on the observation that equation 
(29) implies 
 
cov  ln
qt
qt−1
, ln
qt− i
qt− i−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ = 0 for all i = 2, 3, ...
so that one can run the regression 
 
 
 ln
qt
qt−1
=
i=2
N∑i ln qt− iqt− i−1 + et (30)
and test the joint hypothesis that  i = 0 for  i = 2, ..., N. Under the null 
hypothesis this test is valid for any number of lags N. In addition, the 
hypothesis that  i = 0 for all  i > 1 is suffi cient for   ln qt/qt−1 to be MA(1). 
The test thus exhausts the empirical implications of the model (25) 
through (27).
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The appendix explains how we construct a test statistic W to test for 
the null hypothesis  i = 0 ( i = 2, … , N) and that this statistic has an χ
2 
asymptotic distribution in the case with stationary regressors. Under 
the agents’ model, however, the regressors contain a small nonstation-
ary component, so that we use Monte- Carlo simulations to fi nd the con-
fi dence intervals.
Table 6 reports the test statistic for N = 4, using data for the years 
1970–2008 for each country. The 10% critical value for W is equal to 
6.4.33 The results in table 6 thus show that agents would accept their 
model of house price behavior (25) and (26) in the light of the G7 house 
price data.34
C. Internal Rationality and Discounted Sums
It appears to be a commonly held view among academic economists that 
rational behavior leaves no room for independent beliefs about prices 
once beliefs about fundamentals are specifi ed. Individual rationality, so 
the argument goes, implies that agents know how to formulate prices as 
discounted sums of future fundamentals. Yet, as discussed in Adam and 
Marcet (2010), this view is generally incorrect and, as explained later, it 
also fails to apply for the model studied in the present paper.
Agents with the belief system  P  described in the previous section fail 
to hold enough knowledge to be able to formulate beliefs about prices 
as a function of their beliefs about fundamentals only. This is the case 
despite all agents being rational. This can be most easily demonstrated 
for the case where the nonnegativity constraint on consumption is 
never binding, so that equation (14) holds each period. Forward itera-
tion on this equation then yields a discounted sum formulation for the 
house price
 
 
qt = Et
P
j=0
∞∑  jt+ j ′G (Ht+ j), (31)
Table 6
Testing the Belief Specifi cation Against the Data
  
United 
States  Japan Germany France Italy  
United 
Kingdom Canada
W statistic 3.6771  4.2934 4.1107  3.6825  5.8853 3.6530  3.7493
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which holds under internal rationality. Importantly, this discounted 
sum involves beliefs about future housing decisions (
 
Ht+ j), in addition 
to beliefs about future fundamentals (
 
t+ j). The agent’s optimal plan for 
future 
 
Ht+ j, however, is a function of the agent’s beliefs about future 
house prices, so that beliefs about future prices still enter the discounted 
sum (31). Moreover, since the belief system  P  fails to incorporate a sin-
gularity linking the future house price to the history of fundamentals, 
one cannot replace beliefs about future house prices by beliefs about 
fundamentals only. The agent’s price beliefs are thus required to deter-
mine the discounted sum (31), while the agent’s beliefs about funda-
mentals are insuffi cient.
VII. Equilibrium Dynamics with Learning
We now explore the equilibrium dynamics in an economy in which 
agents hold the near- REE beliefs  P  specifi ed in the previous section. We 
fi rst derive the evolution of the conditional house price growth expecta-
tions mt implied by the probability measure  P , then discuss the result-
ing price dynamics.
A. Belief Updating
Bayesian updating of beliefs implies that agents’ posterior beliefs about 
βt at time t are given by 
 ln t ∼ N(ln mt, 0
2),
where  ln mt evolves recursively according to 
 
 
ln mt = ln mt−1 + g ln
qt
qt−1
− ln mt−1⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ , (32)
with the “gain” parameter given by
 
g =
0
2


2
> 0.
Agents’ conditional expectations of house price growth are then 
given by
 
Et
P qt+1
qt
= mte
(1/2)(0
2 + 
2 + 
2) ≈ mt,
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with mt evolving according to equation (32). Furthermore, to avoid si-
multaneity between price expectations and price outcomes, it is conve-
nient to assume that information on prices is introduced with a delay in 
mt, so that we actually use
 
 
ln mt = ln mt−1 + g ln
qt−1
qt−2
− ln mt−1⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ . (33)
A microfounded belief system justifying this delay is provided in prop-
osition 2 in Adam and Marcet (2010).
B. Qualitative Behavior of Equilibrium Prices under Learning
This section discusses the qualitative behavior of equilibrium house 
prices under learning. To simplify the discussion we consider the ap-
proximate solution when linearizing G around its steady state value, so 
that  ′G  is constant. The asset pricing equation (19) then implies that the 
equilibrium asset price under learning is (approximately) given by
 
 
qt =
t ′G (H ss)
1 − mt
, (34)
so that realized log house price growth is 
 
 
ln
qt
qt−1
= ln
1 − mt−1
1 − mt
+ ln εt. (35)
For the case with vanishing prior uncertainty (
 


2 , 0
2 → 0), the gain g is 
small so that mt changes only slowly from period to period. Beliefs then 
remain close to mt = 1 for all t in the sample and the aforementioned 
price is well defi ned because ρ < 1. 
The key feature of house prices under learning is that there is feed-
back between expectations of price growth and actual price growth. 
Equation (34) shows that higher expected growth mt leads to higher 
price and thus higher realized price growth, which in turn increases 
the  expectations tomorrow via the belief updating rule (32). There-
fore, the model has the potential to generate price booms that are fueled 
by the interaction between expectations and realized prices.
This can formally be shown by combining (35) and (33) to obtain a 
nonlinear  second- order difference equation governing the behavior of 
mt. The dynamics of this difference equation are very similar to those 
described in section 4.2.1 of Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini (2010) for 
stock prices. They show that price changes display momentum locally 
This content downloaded from 193.145.219.216 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 04:43:55 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
House Price Booms and the Current Account 105
around the REE value; that is, once prices start growing (falling), there 
is a tendency for prices to continue growing (falling), as well as there 
being mean reversion in the longer run.
Within the linearized system, house price increases will come to an 
end when realized house price growth falls short of the expected price 
growth. Equation (35) shows that this occurs whenever the increase in 
price growth optimism becomes too weak to sustain the high level of 
price growth expectations. For example, if mt is very high, but stays 
constant from one period to the next ( mt = mt−1), then equation (35) im-
plies that realized price growth is equal to 1 on average (i.e., falls short 
of expectations).
More generally, the upward price dynamics can come to an end for a 
number of additional reasons. For example, if there is an increase in real 
interest rates that causes house prices to increase less than initially ex-
pected, or if a negative shock to housing preferences materializes. Fi-
nally, the endogenous model dynamics will make it diffi cult for sus-
tained price increases to continue forever, especially in the more general 
case with a concave G function. Upward price dynamics and the associ-
ated expansion of the housing stock then lead to a fall in  ′G  and thereby 
to a fall in the asset price.
Once price growth realizations fall short of agents’ expectations, this 
sets in motion a sequence of downward belief revisions. Following the 
initial disappointment, there will be a decrease in price growth expec-
tations, thereby a further fall in realized house price growth; that is, a 
sequence of downward belief revisions and a price bust. The model 
thus has the potential to generate a house price boom, which eventually 
will lead to a bust.
C. The Qualitative Response to Interest Rates Changes
We now explore the effects of an unanticipated decrease in real inter-
est rates in period t.35 Equation (35) implies that realized house price 
growth in period t increases as a result of a reduction in real interest 
rates.36 The price increase is thereby stronger for an economy in which 
agents in period t are more optimistic about future price growth (in 
which mt is higher).
After a fall in real interest rates, the initial increase in realized price 
growth will feed into future beliefs about price growth via the belief 
updating equation (33). Due to the presence of momentum this leads to 
a sequence of further increases in realized price growth.
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Key to explaining the real house price data shown in fi gure 6, how-
ever, is the fact that interest rates are not the only determinant of 
whether or not a price boom occurs. If the house price in a given coun-
try has been increasing already before the reduction in interest rates, 
then the interest rate reduction will make it more likely that the house 
price boom will continue in this country. Conversely, in a country where 
house prices have been decreasing, the interest rate reduction may only 
ameliorate the decrease in house prices. Therefore, the model is consis-
tent with the observation that house price booms are not synchronized 
across countries, even though interest rates behave in a similar way.
A house price boom also relaxes the collateral constraint and leads to 
an increase in total borrowing, which is given by 
 
bt =
qtmt
R
Ht .
House price increases are thus associated with increased international 
borrowing; that is, a current account defi cit. Provided investment in 
new houses is not too elastic, the house price boom will also be associ-
ated with a consumption boom.
Finally, from equation (6) it follows that an increase in expected house 
price growth leads to an increase in the production of new houses, 
thereby qualitatively matching the observation about new housing 
supply displayed in fi gure 4. Admittedly, the model cannot reproduce 
the asymmetric and sharp decline in new housing construction after the 
Fig. 6. RE real house price dynamics (stylized real rate from fi gure 2)
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year 2006. Given the simplicity of the model, however, this should be 
hardly surprising.
Qualitatively, the previous fi ndings show that the model has the 
potential to explain a housing boom that is associated with a current 
account defi cit, a consumption increase, and an increase in the produc-
tion of new housing units. The next sections explore the ability of the 
learning model to quantitatively account for the real house price and 
current account dynamics in the United States and the remaining G7 
economies.
VIII. The US Experience: 2001–2008
We now calibrate the learning model to the US economy and show that 
it can quantitatively replicate the real house price and current account 
developments for the US economy over the years 2001–2008. The perfor-
mance for the remaining G7 economies is analyzed in the next section.
We use as data inputs the history of real house prices over the years 
1996–2000 and the stylized path for real interest rates of the years 2001–
2008, as captured by the dashed line in fi gure 2.37 Except for the stylized 
information about the real interest rate, the predictions we show follow-
ing do not use any data after the year 2000.
As in Section V, subsection D, we choose θ = 0.26, δ = 0.96, and d = 3%. 
The gain parameter g in the belief updating equation (33) and second 
derivative  ′′G  are chosen to minimize the distance between the 
 model- implied prediction for the real house price and the data (we will 
be more precise about this step in Section IX). This leads to an annual 
gain of g = 0.06, which implies that agents believe that, on average, 94% 
of any observed annual house price increase is transitory in nature.
We set the initial price growth expectations in 1996 as if the model 
had been in REE for a very long time (i.e., we choose  m1996 = 1). We then 
use the belief updating equation (33) from the model and the real house 
price growth observation from the US data for the years 1996 to 2000 to 
impute house price beliefs for the year 2000 ( m2000). We then use  m2000 
and the real interest rate  R1996−2000 to compute the equilibrium real house 
price for the year 2000. We thereby normalize the equilibrium real 
house price in the year 2000 to 100 by choosing the value of   ′G (H) cor-
respondingly.38 We then use the model to predict the real house price for 
the years 2001–2008, using as inputs only the interest rate decrease for 
the years 2001–2005 and the increase for the years 2006–2008.
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Figure 7 reports the  model- predicted outcome jointly with the US 
real house price series for the years 2000–2008. The model shows that 
the decrease in real interest rates in the year 2001 gives rise to an initial 
increase in the real house price. Since realized price increases feed posi-
tively into future beliefs via the updating equation, the initial increase 
will be followed by further upward price movements, giving rise to a 
house price boom. The increase comes to an end in the year 2006 when 
interest rates move up again, causing the house price to slowly revert 
direction, in line with the data. The resulting downward revision in 
beliefs then sets in motion a sequence of price reductions.
Figure 7 also depicts the  model- predicted counterfactual house price 
path that would be obtained if real interest rates in the years 2001–2008 
remained at their pre- 2001 average.39 House prices would then have 
increased only very mildly. A small increase would have occurred nev-
ertheless, simply because of the positive price momentum that existed 
already prior to the year 2000. The model is thus consistent with the 
view that the US housing price boom was mostly caused by interest 
rates being too low for too long.
The current account dynamics implied by the housing boom in 
fi gure  7 depend partly on the long- run housing supply elasticity 
 (/(1 − )), because housing can be used as collateral in international 
borrowing. For their preferred specifi cation, Topel and Rosen (1988) es-
timate a long- run housing supply elasticity of 3 for the United States. 
Since there is considerable uncertainty about this parameter, we allow 
Fig. 7. US real house prices: Model predictions, data and counterfactual
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for values between 1 and 5, and choose the long- run elasticity that best 
fi ts the data, we will be more precise about the fi tting procedure be-
low.40 The model then prefers a relative elastic supply with  /(1 − ) = 5. 
Figure 8 depicts the current account ratio in the data and the one im-
plied by the model. The model predicts well the deterioration of the US 
current account over the years 2001 to 2005, but overpredicts the im-
provements following the house price collapse after 2005. Overall, the 
quantitative performance of the model is surprisingly good, given that 
it abstracts from so many other factors known to be relevant for the cur-
rent account (e.g., public borrowing).
Figure 8 also depicts the counterfactual reaction of the current ac-
count if real interest rate had stayed at their 1996–2000 average. The 
model predicts that a large part of the current account defi cits would 
have been eliminated, had interest rates not decreased after the year 
2000. This is the result of a lower volume of collateral and a lower col-
lateral value in the absence of a price and construction boom.
IX. Other G7 Economies: 2001–2008
We now evaluate the ability of the learning model to explain the real 
house price and current dynamics over the years 2001–2008 in the re-
maining G7 economies and we describe in detail the calibration proce-
dure for the parameters  g, ′′G , , y.
Fig. 8. US current account defi cit ratio: Model predicted and data
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A. Real House Price Dynamics
We tie our hands by using the same model parameters for all G7 coun-
tries.41 We also subject each of the G7 economies to the same stylized 
interest rate path as the US economy, which amounts to interpreting 
the US real mortgage rate as a proxy for international real interest rates. 
Clearly, this approach biases results against us, as we could instead 
choose to parameterize the model for each country to achieve a better fi t 
with the data. As we show following, the model nevertheless performs 
surprisingly well.
It is important to note that countries differ because of the method for 
fi nding initial beliefs  m2000, so that the different  country- specifi c house 
price histories over the years 1996–2000 lead to different imputed be-
liefs in the year 2000.
In order to obtain the parameters  g, ′′G ,  we proceed as follows. We 
fi rst obtain  (g, ′′G ) by minimizing the square deviations between model 
and actual data. More precisely, letting boldface letters denote actual 
data, we choose  (g, ′′G ) to minimize 
 i=1
6∑ 
t=2000
2008∑ (qti − qti)2,
where 
 
qt
i is the model implied house price in country i and period t for 
a given value of parameters. We exclude the United Kingdom from this 
computation, as our experience is that for the value of g that is chosen 
by this procedure, the United Kingdom generates an explosive path for 
prices. Proceeding in this way we obtain the values g = 0.06 and  ′′G = 0, 
as mentioned in the previous section. The best match with the data is 
thus achieved for a linear G function. Yet, to keep our analysis within a 
well- specifi ed model, we impose a minimal amount of curvature by 
setting   ′′G / ′G = −0.007 .42 Next, we determine separately the optimal 
value for g for the United Kingdom, which turns out to be g = 0.046. 
The outcome from simulating the economy with these parameters 
is depicted in fi gure 9. It shows that our model predicts strong house 
price increases for France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, in line with 
the empirical evidence. The model predicts considerably weaker price 
increases for Germany and Japan than for the countries just mentioned, 
albeit it fails to replicate the observed fall in house prices. Since real 
house prices in Germany and Japan have been falling prior to the year 
2000, the presence of momentum in house price changes implies that 
This content downloaded from 193.145.219.216 on Thu, 26 Feb 2015 04:43:55 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
House Price Booms and the Current Account 111
agents’ price growth expectations tend to decrease further. Yet the in-
terest rate reduction turns this negative momentum into some slight 
positive momentum. For Canada the model predicts a house price 
boom, but underpredicts its size, especially at the end of the sample 
period.
Table 7 reports for each year the  cross- country correlation between 
the  model- predicted real house price and the real house price in the 
data. The table shows that this correlation is very high throughout. The 
model thus accounts surprisingly well for the asynchronous low fre-
quency movements in house prices, despite the fact that we subject all 
economies to the same interest rate shocks and use a very parsimonious 
parameterization.
Fig. 9. Other G7 economies: Model predicted real house prices and real house price 
data.
Table 7
Yearly Cross- Sectional Correlation between Model- Predicted and Actual Real House 
Price for the G7
Year  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
House price .84  .91  .92  .90  .86  .83  .79  .76
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B. Current Account Dynamics
We now evaluate the ability of the learning model to explain the current 
account dynamics for the remaining G7 economies. Using the values of 
 (g, ′′G ) determined in the previous section, we choose the value of the 
long- run housing supply elasticity  /(1 − ) that best fi ts the observed 
current account dynamics across countries and periods. We thereby use 
an analogous objective function, as in the case when matching the 
house price dynamics. We restrict the search to supply elasticities in the 
interval  /1 −  ∈1, 5] to be consistent with the fi ndings in Topel and 
Sherwin (1988), as discussed in Section VII. Our procedure then chooses 
the highest admissible value in this interval.
The model is clearly not well suited to explain the level of the current 
account in all countries. Since the discount factor of domestic house-
holds falls short of R–1, all countries will want to be borrowers on aver-
age, while some countries (e.g., Germany and Japan) are known to have 
persistent surpluses and also to have accumulated positive net foreign 
asset positions. Given this, we explore the ability of the model to ex-
plain the cyclical movements across time and the overall improvement 
or worsening of the current account during the studied period.
Table 8 reports the annual correlation across countries, between the 
 model- implied current account to GDP ratio and the actual current ac-
count to GDP ratio, where output y in the model is chosen to be time- 
invariant and equal to ten times the steady state housing output. As is 
apparent from the table, the model is able to capture a sizable part of 
the current account fl uctuations across countries.
As a further check, we determine the  model- implied correlation 
(across countries) between the total accumulated current account defi -
cit over the period 2000–2007 and house price growth over the same 
period. In the model, this correlation equals to –0.98. In the data this 
correlation is of the same sign but achieves a lower value of around 
–.5, depending on the precise measure for house prices used (see 
table 2). The fact that the correlation is much higher in the model than 
Table 8
Yearly Cross- Sectional Correlation between Model- Predicted and Actual Current 
Account GDP Ration for the G7
Year  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008
CA/GDP ratio .47  .57  .53  .60  .61  .57  .49  .30
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in the data arguably refl ects the fact that other  model- omitted factors 
have infl uenced the current account behavior in the data. Introducing 
such additional factors into the model would most likely reduce the 
 model- implied correlation.
X. Testing the Model Consistency of Beliefs
This section discusses whether agents in our calibrated model could 
easily detect that they are using a wrong model to forecast house prices. 
While outcomes and beliefs are close to each other (in distribution) 
when 
 


2 is suffi ciently small, it remains to check that this is indeed the 
case for the values of 
 


2  implied by the calibrated gain parameter 
g = 0.06.
We address this issue by assuming that agents apply an econometric 
test to the data generated by their model (25) and (26) of price behav-
ior.43 Specifi cally, we compute the probability that agents would reject 
their model of house price behavior using the W test- statistic proposed 
in Section VI, subsection B, which is based on the regression (30). We 
thereby assume that agents run this test using data for the years 2000–
2008 and compute the probability that the model will be rejected when 
ζ follows a unit root with the estimated standard deviation of 
 ε = 0.0115, which is obtained from data on rental prices. We use 50,000 
replications of the model under learning with the calibrated parameter 
values. Table 9 reports the probability of rejecting the agents’ beliefs 
when testing at the 1%, 5%, and 10% signifi cance level, respectively. 
The test uses data generated by the model and confi dence intervals for 
the W statistic obtained from the Monte- Carlo simulation for a sample 
length of 8 model periods (corresponding to the years 2001–2008).
Table 9 shows that the probability of rejecting the model is fairly close 
to the actual confi dence level. Clearly, under rational expectations, the 
rejection probabilities would exactly equal the corresponding confi -
dence levels. The table thus shows that our learning agents reject their 
forecasting model with very similar likelihood as agents holding ratio-
nal expectations who also test their forecasting model.
Table 9
Testing Belief Specifi cation with W Statistic on Data Generated by the 
Learning Model
Confi dence level  1%  5%  10%
Probability of rejecting .0106  .573  .1251
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XI. Conclusions
A simple model of learning can quantitatively account for the G7 house 
price developments over the recent housing boom and bust period. The 
model also explains a sizable portion of the  cross- sectional dispersion 
of the G7 current accounts and the correlation between the current ac-
count and house prices over time.
The model predicts that a persistent fall in the level of the real interest 
rate can fuel a persistent and long- lasting increase in real house prices. 
Whether or not such a boom materializes depends crucially on the de-
gree to which agents expect future capital gains already—that is, on the 
past price dynamics and shocks hitting the economy.
The model suggests that house price booms can give rise to important 
welfare distortions because they lead to an overextension of the hous-
ing stock. It thus appears of interest to explore to what extent policy 
instruments (e.g., adjustments in the permissible leverage ratio or real 
interest rates) can usefully prevent an excessive  build- up of the hous-
ing stock. The welfare effects of a house price boom thereby depend not 
only on the size and duration of the house price increase, but also on the 
underlying elasticity of housing supply.
Appendix
Nonnegativity Constraints on Consumption
We now determine the behavior of the model when the nonnegativity 
constraints on consumption are binding.
Since δR < 1, it is immediate that c0 is high and b0 is against the bor-
rowing limit as long as the limit is tight enough.
In the main text we supposed that the collateral constraint is binding 
in all periods. As we show now, this could lead to a violation of the non-
negativity constraint on consumption whenever income yt is not high 
enough. Consider, for example, a case when 
 
Ej
Pqj +1H j  has large fl uctua-
tions, it is very high at j = t and very low at j = t + 1. If borrowing is at 
the collateral limit in both periods, then this implies a large decrease in 
debt at t + 1. And if income  yt+1 is not high enough, this would require 
negative consumption in t + 1. The optimal solution then cannot have 
the feature that the collateral constraint is binding periods t and t + 1 
simultaneously.
In such a situation one can determine the optimal solution as follows. 
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Conjecture that the nonnegativity constraint on consumption is binding 
only in period t + 1 but not binding in period t, so that we have γt = 0. 
From the nonbinding zero limit in t we have λt = 1 and from (12) we 
obtain  t+1 > 1, as  R < 1, so that indeed  ct+1 = 0. The binding borrowing 
constraint at t + 1 then determines  bt+1. Using this and the fact that 
 ct+1 = 0, one obtains bt from the budget constraint at t + 1. The value for 
ct then follows from the budget constraint at t. Moreover, since  t+1 > 0 
we can have (12) holding and  t+ 2 = 1 so that  t+ 2 = 0 and  ct+ 2 > 0, so 
that from t + 2 onwards we are back in the case analyzed in the main text 
where consumption is positive and the collateral constraint is  binding.
If the previous solution would still imply negative consumption in t, 
then one would have to extend the approach to a setting where con-
sumption is zero for more than one period, say between periods  t + 1, . . ., 
 t + n. In this case we would have that the collateral constraint being non-
binding for n periods (i.e., for periods  t, … , t + n − 1) and one could work 
backwards to derive a candidate solution in the same manner as de-
scribed earlier. Again, after period t + n one would be back in the setting 
analyzed in the main text.
Therefore, if 
 
Ej
Pqj +1H j  is anticipated to be very low in the next period, 
today’s borrowing limit is not binding. All that is required to have an 
equilibrium where the borrowing limit is always binding is that fl uc-
tuations in 
 
Ej
Pqj +1H j  are not large and that the parameter θ is suffi -
ciently low.
Details for the  Linear- Quadratic Approximation
The main text derives equilibrium quantities under the linear approxi-
mation to G. We now extend the analysis to a quadratic approximation 
of  G(⋅). Besides increasing the order of the approximation, this is of inter-
est because it introduces an interaction between housing prices and the 
level of housing construction. Considering concavity in  G(⋅) is also use-
ful because it makes it less likely that explosive paths for prices will 
arise under learning: as house prices and new construction increases, 
the marginal value of housing services  ′G (Ht) decreases, which exerts a 
dampening effect on the upward prices dynamics under learning.
We show following that the unique locally nonexplosive RE solution 
then takes the form
 
qˆt = a
REˆt + bREHˆt
Hˆt+1 = c
REHˆt + dREˆt,
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where hatted variables denote deviations from the steady state and 
 (a
RE, bRE, cRE, dRE) are given coefficients satisfying  a
RE > 0,  b
RE < 0, 
 0 < c
RE < 1, and  d
RE > 0.
We now derive a  fi rst- order accurate approximation to the RE solu-
tion of the equation system
 
 
qt =

R
+ (1 − d − )⎛⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ EtPqt+1 + t ′G (Ht) (36)
  Ht+1 = (1 − d)Ht + S(EtPqt+1, −1). (37)
We linearize these equations around some steady state ( q, H, ); that is, 
around a point solving the above system of equation for  qt = q, Ht = H, 
and  t =  for all t. Letting hatted variables again denote deviations 
from steady state values, a  fi rst- order approximation to (36) delivers
  qˆt = Et
Pqˆt+1 + ′G ˆt +  ′′G Hˆt, (38)
where, as in the text,   = [(/R) + (1 − d − )] and with all derivatives 
evaluated at the steady state. A linearization of (37) delivers
  Hˆt+1 = (1 − d)Hˆt + ′S EtPqt+1. (39)
We now conjecture a perceived law of motion (PLM) of the form
 qˆt = aˆt + bHˆt.
With RE and using the law of motion for ζt we have 
  Etqˆt+1 = aˆt + bEtHˆt+1. (40)
Substituting into (39) delivers
 Hˆt+1 = (1 − d)Hˆt + ′S (aˆt + bEtHˆt+1).
Taking the expectations Et of this equation delivers
 
 
EtHˆt+1 =
(1 − d)
(1 − ′S b) Hˆt +
′S a
(1 − ′S b) ˆt, (41)
so that (40) implies 
 
 
Etqˆt+1 = aˆt +
(1 − d)b
(1 − ′S b) Hˆt +
′S ab
(1 − ′S b) ˆt. (42)
Substituting this into (38) delivers the actual law of motion (ALM)
 
qˆt = a + 
′S ab
(1 − ′S b) + ′G
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ˆt + 
(1 − d)b
(1 − ′S b) +  ′′G
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ Hˆt .
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Equation coeffi cients in the ALM and PLM delivers two conditions for 
aRE and bRE given by
 
aRE = aRE +  ′S aREbRE
1 − ′S bRE + ′G
 
bRE =  (1 − d)bRE
1 − ′S bRE +  ′′G .
The second equation depends only on bRE but is quadratic, the fi rst is 
linear in aRE, conditional on bRE
 0 = ′S (bRE)2 + (−1 + (1 − d) − ′S  ′′G )bRE +  ′′G ,
which has two solutions
 
b1
∗ = (1 − (1 − d) + ′S  ′′G ) + (−1 + (1 − d) − ′S  ′′G )2 − 4 ′S  ′′G
2 ′S
 
b2
∗ = (1 − (1 − d) + ′S  ′′G ) − (−1 + (1 − d) − ′S  ′′G )2 − 4 ′S  ′′G
2 ′S .
The corresponding solution for a is 
 
 
ai
∗ = ′G
1 − [/(1 − ′S bi∗)]
. (43)
From (39) and (42) it follows that the dynamics for  Hˆt  are given by
 
 
Hˆt+1 = (1 − d)Hˆt + ′S EtPqt+1
= (1 − d)Hˆt + ′S ai∗ˆt + (1 − d)bi
∗
(1 − ′S bi∗)
Hˆt +
′S ai∗bi∗
(1 − ′S bi∗)
ˆt
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
= 1 − d
1 − ′S bi∗
Hˆt +
′S ai∗
1 − ′S bi∗
ˆt .  (44)
Since 1 > d > 0, we have that  ′S bi∗ < 0 is a suffi cient condition for the 
dynamics for  Hˆt  to be locally nonexplosive. It is easy to show that the 
solution ( a2
∗, b2∗) is nonexplosive, while ( a1∗, b1∗) implies locally explosive 
dynamics. Therefore,  (a
RE, bRE) = (a2
∗, b2∗) and  bRE < 0. The values for 
 (c
RE, dRE) follow from equation (44). As we show in the next section, 
there exists no other locally nonexplosive RE equilibrium.
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Local Uniqueness of the RE Solution
We now show that there exists no other locally nonexplosive RE solu-
tion than the one derived in the previous section. We bring the linear-
ized equation (39) and (38) in vector notation: 
 
1 − ′S
0 
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
Hˆt+1
Et
Pqˆt+1
⎛
⎝⎜⎜
⎞
⎠⎟⎟
= 1 − d 0− ′′G 1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
Hˆt
qˆt
⎛
⎝⎜⎜
⎞
⎠⎟⎟
+ 0− ′G
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ t.
Inverting the matrix on the left, which is always invertible, we get
 
Hˆt+1
Et
Pqˆt+1
⎛
⎝⎜⎜
⎞
⎠⎟⎟
=
1 − 

′′G ′S − d 1

′S
− 

′′G 1

⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟
Hˆt
qˆt
⎛
⎝⎜⎜
⎞
⎠⎟⎟
+
− 1

′G ′S
− 1

′G
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟⎟⎟
0
− ′G
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ t,
which is a system with one predetermined and one “jump” variable. It 
has a locally unique REE if the fi rst matrix on the  right- hand side has 
one explosive and one stable eigenvalue. The eigenvalues are
 
1 =
1
2
( − d −  ′′G ′S + 1 + ( − d −  ′′G ′S + 1)2 + 4(d − 1))
 
2 =
1
2
( − d −  ′′G ′S + 1 − ( − d −  ′′G ′S + 1)2 + 4(d − 1)).
It is straightforward to show that  1 is unstable ( 1 > 1) while  2 is a 
stable eigenvalue ( − 1 < 2 < 1).
Test of Agents’ Model
This appendix shows how to design a test statistic for equation (30). 
Following standard practice in the unit- root literature, the statistic is 
such that it would be effi cient within a certain class of estimators in the 
stationary case. Consider a version of equation (30)
 
 
 ln
qt
qt−1
= ′ xt + et, (45)
where xt is stationary and ergodic, orthogonal to et, and   ln(qt/qt−1) is 
MA(1). Let  T
OLS be the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator with a 
sample of T observations. We defi ne the test statistic
 WT ≡ TOLS′ ( ′X X)−1Sw,T( ′X X)−1⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
−1
T
OLS
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where
 X = [x1, ..., xT ′]
 
Sw,T =
t=1
T∑  log qt
qt−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
2
xt ′xt + TT − 1 t=2
T∑  log qt
qt−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟  log
qt−1
qt−2
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ xt ′xt−1
 
+ T
T − 1 t=1
T−1∑  log qt
qt−1
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟  log
qt+1
qt
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ xt ′xt+1.
Clearly,  (1/T)Sw,T is a consistent estimator of the spectral density evalu-
ated at frequency zero when et is MA(1) and independent of xt.
Using standard results it can be shown that under the null hypothesis 
(α = 0) we have
 WT → 32 in distribution as T → ∞.
Clearly, this asymptotic result cannot be applied to testing equation 
(30), since the regressors in (30) are nonstationary. We therefore derive 
correct confi dence intervals for WT by Monte- Carlo simulation for a 
given sample size T and given parameter values (the confi dence inter-
vals turn out not to be very different from those of an χ2 distribution). 
The set of parameters consists only of the variances 
 


2 and  v
2, so that it 
is easy to test for the sensitivity of the confi dence intervals. We fi nd that 
the main results would be nonaltered for a wide range of values for 
these variances.
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1. For example, The Economist (August 23, 2007), “Does America Need a Recession?”, 
Economic Focus.
2. Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) show that with low real interest rates a further 
reduction in rates can give rise to a large house price increase under rational expectations. 
It fails, however, to give rise to a persistent sequence of house price increases.
3. The data is taken from the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) Economic Outlook No. 87, 2010, Annex Tables 59 and 60. The real house price 
index is the nominal house price index defl ated by CPI price index.
4. The data is from the OECD Economic Outlook No. 87, 2010, Annex Table 51.
5. The change in housing value is computed using the Federal Reserve Board Flow of 
Funds Statistics, Table B.100, Release 2010- 12- 9. The current account numbers are taken 
from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) tables, as downloaded through 
the FRB St. Louis FRED database.
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6. The mortgage rate is the “1- year adjustable rate mortgage average in the United 
States” from Freddie Mac (SeriesID: MORTGAGE1US).
7. The real private consumption growth data is from the OECD Economic Outlook 
No.87, 2010, Annex Table 3. The house price series employ the same data as used for 
fi gure 1.
8. The housing units data is from the US Census Bureau, using the series “new pri-
vately owned housing units completed.” The house price series are the same as the ones 
shown in fi gure 1.
9. Data limitations prevent us from discussing the behavior of new housing construc-
tion or the relationship between value changes of the housing stock and the current ac-
count for all G7 countries.
10. Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009) also provide evidence on the strong positive associa-
tion between current account defi cits and the appreciation of real estate prices across a 
number of countries.
11. The fi gure looks very similar when depicting instead the the  price- to- rent ratio or 
the  price- to- income ratio.
12. As explained in Adam and Marcet (2011), common knowledge of agents’ prefer-
ences and beliefs might place additional restrictions on the house price beliefs that ratio-
nal agents can entertain, so we need to assume absence of common knowledge.
13. The data is from the OECD, using a sample spanning the years 1970–2008. Italy is 
excluded because the rental data is only available from 1996 onwards. The regression 
used in the Dickey Fuller test is based on the model 
 
log t =  +  log t − 1 + εt, and the null 
hypothesis   = 0,   = 1 is tested against the alternative   ≠ 0 and   < 1. The reported sta-
tistic is the estimate for   − 1 divided by its estimated standard deviation.
14. Using current houses prices instead of expected future prices in the borrowing con-
straint (5) would make virtually no difference for our purposes, as actual and expected 
prices tend to move together in the learning model we consider.
15. It is easy to rule out interest rates below R as then domestic and foreign agents 
both wish to borrow, implying that the loan market cannot clear. For interest rates above 
R the foreign lender wishes to borrow up to its borrowing constraint. If the foreign agent 
is suffi ciently wealthy, this would lead to a violation of the nonnegativity constraint on 
domestic consumption. It thus has to be the case that the interest rate equals R. Provided 
the foreign lender is suffi ciently wealthy, lending to domestic agents will imply nonnega-
tive consumption for the foreign lender.
16. As should become from Section IV, subsection A, one should use a slightly different 
belief system for fi rms than used for consumers because profi ts are a choice variable for 
fi rms, while consumers take profi ts as given. Since this does not affect the expectations 
showing up in the subsequent fi rm optimality conditions, we ignore this issue in the text.
17. Existence of a maximum can be insured, for example, by imposing that the utility 
from consumption (ct) is bounded at some very high level. See Appendix A.1 in Adam 
and Marcet (2011) for how this can be achieved in a related model.
18. A full characterization of optimal outcomes is found in the appendix. Since zero 
consumption does not accord well with the data, this approach appears justifi ed.
19. Although a large drop in the expected future house price may imply that loans 
have to be repaid to an extent that consumption would have to become negative, we 
consider values of the shocks for which this does not occur for the T + 1 periods in our 
simulations.
20. Existence and uniqueness follow from the following considerations. Equation (21) 
defi nes q as a continuous and (weakly) decreasing function of H, which approaches +∞ as 
 H → 0 and −∞ as  H → H . From (22) we have that q is a strictly increasing function of H. 
As a result, there exists a unique intersection.
21. The subsequent equation reveals that suffi ciently small housing perference shocks 
will indeed imply that Ht stays in the neighborhood of H with high likelihood, as initially 
assumed.
22. The former follows from  a
RE > 0, and the latter from  d
RE > 0 and  b
RE < 0.
23. The initial real interest rate is set equal to the average ex ante gross real mortgage 
rate over the periods 1996–2000 (i.e., 
 
R9 6 − 0 0 = 1.0335). In the year 2001 we then consider 
an expected and permanent fall in the real interest rate that lasts for fi ve years to a value 
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of 
 
R0 1− 0 5 = 1.0228, which is equal to the average ex ante US real mortgage rate for this 
period. Thereafter, we consider an unexpected and permanent upward shift in real rates 
to 
 
R0 6 − 0 8 = 1.0301, which is again taken from the data.
24. This is required to insure optimality of the binding collateral constraint.
25. Since ζt = ζ, the  price- to- rent ratio is simply proportional to the real house price 
series.
26. The intuition for this outcome should become clear from the  linear- approximate 
solution derived in Section V, subsection B.
27. This holds true even in a Bayesian Rational Expectations Equilibrium in which 
agents learn about fundamentals (see Adam and Marcet 2011 for details).
28. Since the process for yt and ζt are exogenous to the model, it is straightforward to 
relax this assumption for these variables.
29. The fact that βt is nonstationary is not important for our results. The model out-
comes are almost the same when specifying instead a stationary process 
 
ln t = (1 − ) +  ln t − 1 + ln t
and choosing some value ρ < 1 that is suffi ciently close to one.
30. Convergence can only occur for an arbitrarily large but fi nite horizon because of 
the unit root present in agents’ beliefs.
31. Again, this holds only for any arbitrarily large but fi nite horizon.
32. This is the case because one can recover vt and ηt from the MA process and then 
fi nd βt.
33. The 10% critial value reported in the text assumes a gain parameter of g = 0.06, 
which is the value that we estimate for our model later on. The critical value, however, 
changes very little over a wide range of values for g.
34. An alternative test is based on using lags of the price over rent ratio on the right 
side of the regression (30), which leads to very similar fi ndings. Rent prices, however, are 
not available for Italy prior to 1996 in our OECD data set.
35. Technically, the change in the real interest rate is a probability zero event under the 
postulated beliefs.
36. The interest rate enters in the defi nition of ρ (see equation [15]).
37. Specifi cally, for the years 1996–2000 we set real interest rates equal to the average 
ex ante gross real mortgage rate (i.e., R96–00 = 1.0335). To capture the real interest rate de-
crease following in years 2001–2005, we set real interest to R01–05 = 1.0228, which is again 
the average ex ante US real mortgage rate for this period in the data. Finally, we capture 
the upward shift in real rates in the years 2006–2008 by setting R06–08 = 1.0301, which is 
again taken from the data.
38. We keep   ′G (H) fi xed at this calibrated value in all subsequent model periods. The 
value for   ′G (H) only normalizes the house price level, but has no impact on the dy-
namics.
39. Gross ex ante real interest rates are then assumed to stay constant at their 1996–
2000 average, which is R96–00 = 1.0335.
40. To obtain a  model- implied current account to GDP ratio, one also has to take a 
stand on the exogenous income process. We choose a time- invariant income (i.e., yt = y) 
so as to match the data.
41. This is true, except for the value of   ′G , which is chosen in each country to normal-
ize the  model- implied real house prices in the year 2000 to 100.
42. The performance of the model deteriorates only slightly, but concavity is required 
to have an independent role for price beliefs, as explained in Section VI, subsection C.
43. A similar approach has been used in models of learning; see Bray and Savin (1986) 
for an early reference.
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